Posts Tagged ‘legislation’

Exceeding Their Authority: When Bureaucrats Create New Crimes, Justice Suffers

Wednesday, December 14th, 2011

One of our bugbears here at The Criminal Lawyer is the excessive number of federal crimes — particularly those that are created by regulators rather than by elected legislators. We’re not alone in this concern, and over the past several months we’ve noticed what can only be called a growing movement for reform.

A particular concern of ours has been the fact that an astonishing number of federal crimes lack any mens rea component. In other words, one can face prison even though their act was perfectly innocent — there was no intent to break the law whatsoever.

Mens rea is an essential part of American criminal justice. We don’t punish people simply because the committed some act or other, or even just because they harmed someone. Even if that harm was grievous. No, before we punish someone, there has to have been some culpability on their part. And culpability is defined by their mental state when they committed the act. There is a spectrum ranging from intentional through accidental, and the closer one was to the intentional end, the more severely we punish them. (If you want to be pedantic about it, there are a couple of other spectra of mental state as well — one’s ability to tell right from wrong, and one’s level of depravity — imagine them as the Y- and Z-axes to the X-axis of mens rea, if you like. But only mens rea is a component of crime itself — the others apply as defenses and as sentencing concerns.)

When defining a crime, here’s how it’s supposed to work: You specify what act you are forbidding, and you specify the mental state required to make it criminal — so bad that it deserves punishment. For example, if you plot to kill your neighbor, and succeed in killing him, then you are going to be punished far more harshly than a careless teenager who kills a family of four when he mistakenly runs a red light. Your act was more intentional, and thus more evil, than that of the teenager. Even though he did far more harm, you are more culpable, and thus your act is more criminal. And a man who accidentally trips on the sidewalk, knocking a little old lady into an oncoming bus? His act isn’t criminal at all. It was purely accidental, and unlike the teen driver he did not deviate from the normal standard of care to any extent that society would punish.

It is true that, as American jurisprudence evolved, there did arise certain “strict liability” crimes that have no mens rea requirement. Things like statutory rape. But those are exceptions to the rule, in the first place. And in the second place, the lack of mens rea is not really applicable — it usually has to do with elements of the crime that your own mental state could not affect one way or the other. For example, in the case of statutory rape, the issue is not whether you knew the girl was under the age of consent, but whether you had sex with someone without their consent — and someone under the age of consent, as a matter of law, cannot have consented to have sex with you. Your mens rea has nothing to do with whether or not she consented. It does not matter whether you knew she was underage, what matters is that she was underage, and thus you had sex with someone without their consent.

But though there were strict liability crimes, they were exceedingly rare.

Until regulators got involved.

Bureaucracy has a way of growing, and of expanding its own authority. Give an agency power to regulate, say, the mouse-pad industry, and they will start writing rules and procedures based on how mouse pads are actually produced and sold. Then they will start writing rules based on how the bureaucrats think mouse pads ought to be produced and sold, perhaps involving idealistic notions or academic fads. Meanwhile, they’ll busily craft tons and tons of rules and procedures micromanaging every aspect of how the main regulations are to be complied with. The number of regulations out there that Americans are expected to follow are uncountable, and nobody knows what’s in all of them. It’s beyond the capacity of the human brain to know what all the rules are.

And all of these rules have the force of law. Even though no elected official ever enacted them. The regulations are imposed, not by elected representatives who speak for (and must answer to) the citizenry, but by unelected government employees answerable to nobody.

That’s all well and good, when (more…)

WTF Feds? Buying Drugs ≠ Facilitating Their Sale

Tuesday, May 26th, 2009

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Not again. It looks like yet another instance of federal prosecutors exercising terrible judgment.

Writing for a unanimous Supreme Court this morning, soon-to-retire Justice Souter clarified what “facilitation” means in criminal law. A buyer calling up a drug dealer to arrange the purchase of some drugs does not count. Apparently, the feds didn’t get the memo.

In this case, Abuelhawa v. U.S., Mohammed Said was a suspected drug dealer whose phone was wiretapped. The wire intercepted six calls from a buyer, Salman Abuelhawa, in which Mr. Abuelhawa arranged two small purchases of cocaine.

The amounts Mr. Abuelhawa bought were strictly misdemeanor level — just one gram each time. But in a bizarre move, the feds charged him with six felony counts of “causing or facilitating” the sales during those intercepted phone calls.

After recovering from the “you’ve gotta be kidding me” stage, Abuelhawa moved to dismiss those charges. But no, the District Court (the Eastern District of Virginia, in Alexandria) said it was perfectly proper to charge a buyer with facilitation of the sale. He was convicted, and appealed to the Fourth Circuit.

The Fourth Circuit also ruled that it’s fine to charge a buyer with facilitation, saying that the word “facilitate” should be given its common meaning, “to make easier or less difficult, or to assist or aid.” Abuelhawa’s request to buy “made the sale possible,” and therefore counted as facilitation.

Ably represented by Joseph McEvoy, of the excellent Virginia law firm of Odin, Feldman & Pittleman, the defendant took it to the Supreme Court.

Writing for the majority, Justice Souter essentially opined “you’ve gotta be kidding me” — only in more genteel language. The government’s overly literal use of “facilitate” he described as sitting “uncomfortably with common usage.”

Where a transaction like a sale necessarily presupposes two parties with specific roles, it would be odd to speak of one party as facilitating the conduct of the other. A buyer does not just make a sale easier; he makes the sale possible. No buyer, no sale; the buyer’s part is already implied by the term “sale,” and the word “facilitate” adds nothing. We would not say that the borrower facilitates the bank loan.

The feds argued that the facilitation wasn’t the request to buy, but rather the use of a cell phone to do so. A sale can happen without using a cell phone. Using a cell phone makes it easier to sell drugs. So therefore “Congress probably meant to ratchet up the culpability of the buyer who calls ahead.”

Souter respectfully pointed out that this argument was stupid. Congress made it a misdemeanor to buy the drugs. It meant for Abuelhawa to be charged with a misdemeanor. It did not mean him to be charged with facilitating the dealer’s felony.

* * * * *

We prosecuted drug dealers for years here in Manhattan, and we have to wonder what these Virginia feds were smoking. No prosecutor in their right mind would seriously consider charging a buyer with facilitation. A lookout is a facilitator. A steerer who directs buyers to a particular dealer is a facilitator. A “stash man” or a “money man” who holds stuff for the seller is a facilitator. The buyer is never a facilitator.

When, as here, a hyper-technical reading of the statute might conceivably result in a charge that nobody intended, a good prosecutor simply smiles wryly at the inept wording of statutes in general. But to actually file such charges would require a shocking lack of judgment.

Judgment. It’s something we require of our prosecutors. They have people’s lives, liberty and reputations at stake. They have victims who need justice. They work within a system that relies on them to do the right thing. So it is imperative that they have the uncommon sense to do, not what is technically allowable, but what is actually appropriate.

Not every prosecutor lives up to the challenge, of course. But lately the feds have been showing a remarkable lack of judgment. This case is just one of many in recent years where federal prosecutors have committed forehead-smacking acts of WTF.

So we have to ask… WTF? Seriously. Federal prosecutors have a well-deserved reputation for being bright, dedicated, hard-working and sensible. But in case after case lately, federal prosecutors have made colossal boners of bad judgment. What’s going on? Did we change how we hire people? Did the pool of applicants change? Did the internal culture change? We’d like to know.

Send us your thoughts, and we’ll see about devoting a column to the more thoughtful responses.

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